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ABSTRACT
Infrastructure systems of transportation, water supply, telecommunications, power supply, etc. are not isolated but
highly interconnected and mutually coupled. Infrastructure interdependences can increase system vulnerability and
produce cascading failures at the regional or national scales. Taking the advantage of network theory structure
analysis, this paper models street, water supply network, power grid and information infrastructure as network layers
that are integrated into a multilayer network. The infrastructure interdependences are detailed using five basic
dependence patterns of network fundamental elements. Definitions of dynamic cascading failures and recovery
mechanisms of infrastructure systems are also established. The main focus of the paper is introduction of a new
infrastructure network resilience measure capable of addressing infrastructure system as well as network component
(layer) interdependences. The new measure is based on infrastructure network performance, proactive infrastructure
network resistance capacity and reactive infrastructure network recovery capacity. With three resilience features and
corresponding network properties, this paper develops the new quantitative measure of dynamic space -time
resilience and a resilience simulation model use three dimensions of resilience and network properties for
infrastructure network assessments. The resilience model is applicable to any type of infrastructure and its
application can improve the infrastructure planning, design and maintenance decision making.
Keywords: resilience, infrastructure system, multilayer network, infrastructure interdependence, adaptive capacity
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the rising cost of infrastructure upkeep and increasing frequency of extreme events affecting its functioning,
Canada’s infrastructure systems have become more vulnerable to natural disasters. Recent examples include Alberta
and Toronto floods of 2013. Infrastructure systems consists of diverse infrastructure elements, including
telecommunications, power supply, natural gas and oil, transportation, water supply, etc. Interdependencies among
different infrastructure elements can produce cascading failures throughout the whole infrastructure system at
regional and national scales (Ouyang 2014). So the infrastructure system resilience is often overestimated (Cutter et
al. 2008) and corresponding protection and recovery strategies don’t always provide desired results.
Infrastructure system resilience refers to the ability of system to resist possible hazards, absorb the initial damage,
and recover to normal operation (Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio 2012, Francis and Bekera 2014). Multidisciplinary
Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER) provides a general resilience framework for definition and
quantification of the physical and organizational systems resilience to earthquakes (Bruneau et al. 2003). As a
follow up of this work, many studies emerged on the quantification of performance and resilience assessment of
utility systems, such as water supply networks (Li and Lence 2007), electric infrastructure systems (Maliszewski and
Perrings 2012, Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio 2014), telecommunications cable systems (Omer et al. 2009) and
underground transportation (D’Lima and Medda 2015). Most of the reported research efforts use for resilience
quantification metrics of system robustness or system recovery rapidity of individual infrastructure system.
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Taking the advantage of network theory structure analysis, infrastructure systems can be described as complex
networks, where nodes represent infrastructure components (such as water pumps and electric transformers), and
links mimic the physical and relational connections among different infrastructure component (such as electric tie
lines and water pipes) (Dudenhoeffer 2006, Johansson and Hassel 2010). Cascading failures across diverse
infrastructure systems can be simulated using topology-based or flow-based methods (Ouyang 2014) that lead to the
estimation of multi-infrastructure system vulnerability. Some of the published research is clearly emphasising
recovery processes to evaluate for example, gas and electric infrastructure system resilience (Filippini and Silva
2014, Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio 2012). However, the infrastructure system resilience should address both,
proactive adjustment capacity and reactive recovery capacity (Manyena 2006).
Simonovic and Peck (2013) point out that continued operation and rapid restoration of the systems affected by a
disturbance are essential for resilience. Resilient infrastructure system is a sustainable network of critical lifelines
that “possess the capacity to survive, cope, recover, learn and transform from disturbances”. So based on the SpaceTime Dynamic Resilience Measure of Simonovic and Peck (2013), this paper integrates multi-infrastructure network
properties and defines a genetic infrastructure system resilience model for quantifying both, dynamic proactive
adjustment capacity and reactive recovery capacity.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the infrastructure system model, including
street, water supply, power supply and information infrastructure components, as a network of networks, or a
multilayer infrastructure network model. Basic dependence patterns of individual infrastructure components for
establishing system dynamic cascading failures and recovery mechanisms are also provided. Section 3 provides a
definition of a new multilayer infrastructure network resilience, and presents dynamic resilience metric under
sequential disturbances. Finally, the potential resilience model applications are discussed.
2. INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK FORMALIZATION
2.1 Infrastructure Network Representation
The infrastructure network model is based on the network theory, where two basic components, nodes and edges,
build up the model of a system. A network is always represented by G, the nodes set and edges set are represented
by N and E respectively. This paper focuses on the main urban infrastructure system networks, including streets,
power grid, water supply network, and information infrastructure.
Street network is represented as GS (NS, ES), where NS is the set of street junctions and end points, and ES is the set
of street segments (Cavallaro 2014). The edges are undirected and homogeneous. Generally, the street network is
fully connected. Water supply network is represented as GW (NW, EW), where waterworks, storage facilities and
pump stations are represented as nodes with different attributes, and water distribution pipes are denoted by edges
(Shuang 2014, Wei and Li 2015). The edges of water supply network are directed as the water flow from waterworks
to pump stations and storage facilities through distribution pipes. Generally, water supply networks are represented
as trees without circle and redundant edges. The downstream nodes and edges could not operate unless all the
upstream nodes and edges function normally. Power grid is represented as GP (NP, EP), where power plants,
distribution and transmission substations are represented by nodes with different attributes, and power lines are
represented by directed edges (Albert 2004, Kinney 2005). Same as for water supply networks, edges of power grid are
directed as the electricity is transmitted from power plants to transmission substations, and then to distributing
stations through power lines. The downstream nodes and edges could not operate unless all the upstream nodes and
edges function normally. Information infrastructure is represented as GI (NI, EI), where Internet service providers are
represented by nodes, and cable connections are denoted as undirected edges (Omer 2009). Since these networks
provide bidirectional exchange of information, the edges are undirected. According to scale, population and
structure of a city, information network structure could be represented as a star, chain or circle shape, and so on. A
node or edge operate normally if there is an existing path connecting to the source node.
All individual infrastructure networks introduced above can be illustrated as individual infrastructure layers.
Infrastructure system model is a network of networks integrating all of the layers, as illustrated in Figure 1
(Dudenhoeffer 2006). Nodes and edges in the same layer are belong to the same kind of infrastructure (intrainfrastructure connection, which denoted by solid lines within the single layer network in Figure 1). Edges crossing
different layers denote dependence of different kinds of infrastructures, illustrating physical and cyber connections
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between different kinds of infrastructures (inter-infrastructure connections, which denoted by dotted lines
connecting different layer networks in Figure 1). Such as the red dotted lines between nodes belong to power grid
and water supply network illustrate electric transmitting from electric infrastructures to water supply infrastructures.

Figure1: Interdependent infrastructure system model representation
As different infrastructure components located in same area are subject to a specific disturbance (disaster), it is
necessary to consider the location of infrastructure in the model description. Furthermore, location of infrastructure
has important effect on topological properties and consequently on infrastructure functioning processes (Barthélemy
2011). So, the spatial attributes of nodes and edges should be included in a realistic infrastructure network model
with geographical coordinates, which can be defined in a two-dimensional Euclidean coordinate system. Therefore,
each node has three coordinates (ϕ,x,y), where ϕ denotes the type of the infrastructure, (x,y) denotes the geographical
location of the node. Edges are denoted by the two adjacent nodes.
2.2 Basic Infrastructure Dependence Patterns
The interdependent networks represent a complex system where emergent behaviors are rarely fully understood.
Urban infrastructure components can be dependent and interdependent in multiple ways. Most of the earlier
literature review interdependencies as macro-properties of coupled systems classified in different ways. For
example, Dudenhoeffer et al. (2006) classifies interdependences into four types: physical, geospatial, policy and
informational.
Interdependence indicates the bidirectional interaction, which includes two directed dependences between two
infrastructure elements (Rinalidi 2001). Generally, not any components malfunction of one infrastructure system can
result in efficiency reduction, function loss or system destruction of another macro-interdependent infrastructure
system. So the macro-interdependence is a function of the system attributes and status of the malfunction
infrastructure systems. Therefore, micro structure, or basic pattern of infrastructure dependence, need to be
considered. The focus of the proposed resilience model is direct impact of infrastructure malfunction, which is
always seen as the first-order effect.
Let us consider two layer infrastructure networks Gϕ1, Gϕ2 where ϕ1 ≠ ϕ2. Every element of the infrastructure has two
exclusive states: on and off. With different relations between four fundamental network structure elements: nodes,
edges, paths and clusters (combinations of nodes and edges), there are five basic infrastructure dependence patterns
(four patterns are illustrated in Figure 2):




Node – Node Dependence (Figure 2a): the state of node ni 1 is dependent on the state of n j 2 , or vice versa. For
example, the state of water pump depends on the state of its connecting electric transmission substation. This pattern
is represented as
(a)
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(b) Node – Edge Dependence (Figure 2b): the state of node ni 1 is dependent on the state of edge eij2 , or vice versa.
For example, the state of Internet service provider depends on its connecting power supply. This pattern is
represented as


(c)
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Node/Edge – Path Dependence (Figure 2c): the state of node ni 1 or edge elk1 is dependent on the state of the














path pim2 , which is represented as {n i 2 , eij2 , n j 2 , e jk2 , n k2 K n m2 } . For example, the state of coal power plant is dependent
on the path (transportation network) connecting the plant with coal supply locations. This pattern is represented as
[3]
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(d) Node/Edge – Cluster dependence (Figure 2d): the state of cluster ci 1 , which is a set of nodes and their edges of




network G  , is dependent on the state of node n l 2 or edge ekl2 of network G  . For example, the operations of water
or power infrastructure with the same geographic or logic attributes being controlled by an Internet service provider.
This pattern is represented as
2

1

[4]





IDNC  nl 2  ci 1

or IDEC  ekl2  ci 1 , where ci   n i eij , (n i  ci , eij  ci ) .





1


1


1


1


1


1

(e) Geographic Dependence: the state of all infrastructure elements located at the same location A are affected by
a disturbance simultaneously. This pattern is represented as
[5]
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(a) Node-Node Dependence

(c) Node-Path Dependence

(b) Node-Edge Dependence

(d) Node-Cluster Dependence

Figure 2: Basic infrastructure dependence patterns
Nodes and edges with different colors (red and blue) represent different kind of infrastructures;
Grey nodes and edges represent malfunctioning infrastructures; arrows represent the time change.
In the previous discussion we looked at two infrastructure networks. The basic dependence patterns can cause
cascading impacts throughout the multilayer network as time goes on. Given three infrastructure networks Gϕ1, Gϕ2
,Gϕ3 (ϕ1 ≠ ϕ2 ≠ ϕ3), there are many combinations of the five basic dependence patterns, which could form chain or
cycle reaction among three single later networks and cause cascading failure spreading throughout the whole
infrastructure system. On the other hand, interdependences could accelerate mitigation and be conducive to
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disturbance response with repair of several components and strengthen system robustness and resilience with local
protection.
2.3 Infrastructure System Dynamic Mechanism
Magnitude of the interrupted services and duration of the interruption are the two main characteristics of the
disturbance of importance for the assessment of consequences (Johansson and Hassel 2010). In practice, an
infrastructure could: (i) absorb the impacts of disturbance and minimize consequences with little effort (i.e.
buffering); (ii) adjust to undesirable conditions by undergoing some changes (adaptation); and (iii) fully recover
from disturbance. All three response modes define the infrastructure adaptive capacity (Francis and Bekera 2014).
The response of the infrastructure system to a disturbance vary with time - adding dynamic properties to
interdependent infrastructure networks (Filippini and Silva 2014).
In order to capture the dynamic character of the disturbance consequences, the change of the infrastructure
performance due to various disturbances needs to be estimated. As discusses in the section 2.2, the state of an
infrastructure is influenced by the disturbance as well as the state of other infrastructure. Let TB denote buffering
time of an infrastructure system, TR its repair time; and TM its malfunction time. The dynamic performance of an
infrastructure system subject to a disturbance can be illustrated using a flow chart in Figure 3. IS in Figure 3 can be a
node, an edge, a cluster and a path of an infrastructure network. Its state is decided by corresponding basic
dependence patterns, and calculated using relationships [1-5].

Figure 3: Dynamic process of an interdependent Infrastructure
3. INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM RESILIENCE MODEL
3.1 Infrastructure System Resilience Definition
The infrastructure system resilience is defined as “the ability to prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and
withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions”, including “the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate
attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents” (Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio 2012). Therefore
infrastructure system resilience includes system performance and its adaptive capacity that can be in two different
forms: proactive adjustment capacity and reactive recovery capacity. As the number of functioning infrastructure
elements and the amount of resources left are the foundations for recovery, the former capacity will directly
influence the latter.
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Infrastructure system, a typical “systems of systems”, is a set of multiple and independently operational systems
interacting with one another to meet specific needs (DeLaurentis and Crossley 2005). So infrastructure system
resilience refers not only to the ability to resist disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change of intra-layer
networks, but also the ability to retain essentially the same function, structure and feedbacks among inter-layer
networks. The former capacity is concerned with an individual infrastructure system. The later need more systematic
thinking and management due to potentially small unforeseen disturbances.
3.2 Three Features of Infrastructure System Resilience
System resilience can be represented and quantified by four key features: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness
and rapidity (Bruneau 2003). As proactive adjustment capacity is a function of network robustness, reactive
recovery capacity can be represent by network resourcefulness and rapidity. Redundancy can be seen as the cause of
robustness (National Infrastructure Advisory Council 2009) and therefore in this paper we analyze the three key
features of resilience: robustness, resourcefulness and rapidity.
3.2.1 Robustness
Robustness refers to the ability of a system to withstand a given level of stress without suffering degradation or loss
function. The common measure for network robustness is the critical fraction at which the system completely
collapses (Albert 2000). Similarly, this paper uses the minimum number of network components withstanding
disturbance to denote infrastructure system robustness. For single layer infrastructure network, robustness
1
R f,ζ
Rob (t 1R ) is computed as minimum and stable ratio of operational components after a disturbance  1 :

[6]
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where t 1R is the moment when n o (t 1R )  eo (t 1R ) starts to be stable after the disturbance  1 . n o is the number of
operational nodes, e o is the number of operational edges, N  and E  are the total number of nodes and edges of
1
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undisturbed network. Multilayer infrastructure network robustness R ζRob

operational elements:

[7]

R

ζ1
Rob

(t 

1RM

)

 (n



o

(t 

1RM

 (N

)  eo (t 

1RM



))

 E )



where t 1RM is the moment when the sum of n o  eo starts to be stable after the disturbance  1 .
3.2.2 Resourcefulness
Resourcefulness is the capacity to make and implement mitigation and response measures to a specific disturbance,
which is limited by the ability to obtain sufficient resources, such as monetary, physical, technological,
informational and human resources. This paper uses the network performance of restoration strategies to a specific
,ζ1
(t) :
disturbance  1 for quantifying resourcefulness, represented as R Res
[8]





,ζ
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(t)  f RS, (t)  SP0, (t)
1

1

1

where RS,1 (t) is a restoration strategy (RS) of network  after disturbance  1 . f() is the network performance of
RS,1 (t) at t, calculated as the ratio of operational nodes and edges to total nodes and edges of network  at t.

SP0,1 (t) is the system performance without restoration strategy (RS), which is calculated as the ratio of operational
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elements to total elements of
resourcefulness R

ζ1
Res





where
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network  after disturbance  1 at t. For multilayer infrastructure network,





,ζ
(t) of single layer networks with corresponding RS, (t) , and
(t) is the integration all the R Res
1

1

calculated as the ratio of normal operational nodes and edges at t.
3.2.3 Rapidity
Rapidity refers to the capacity to meet priorities and achieve goals in a timely manner. Duration of system recovery
to normal operational levels is always used as a measure to evaluate system resilience, and can be seen as the main
figure-of-merit to evaluate reactive recovery capacity. This paper uses the duration of system recovery to denote
,ζ1
rapidity, represented as R Rap
:
[10]

,ζ1
1
R Rap
 t  (R ζRes
)  t 1O or

[11]

,ζ1
R Rap
 t 2 O  t 1O ,

1
) is the moment when single layer infrastructure network  recovers to normal operational level, t 1O
where t  (R ζRes

is the moment disturbance  1 occurs. t 2 O is the moment disturbance ζ 2 occurs. Equation [10] is used for single
disturbance or the last disturbance of a sequence of disturbances. Equation [11] is used in other situations. For
1
multilayer infrastructure networks, rapidity R ζRap
is measured by the longest rapidity of single layer networks:
[12]





,ζ
R ζRap =max R Rap
(t)
1

1

3.3. Dynamic Infrastructure System Resilience Metric
System performance and its adaptive capacity represent dynamic system behavior in response to system disturbance
and application of various adaptation measures. Original Space-Time Dynamic Resilience Measure developed by
Simonovic and Peck (2013) is adapted in this research to complex network infrastructure systems. It quantifies
resilience as the difference between the area under expected system performance and actual system performance
(dotted shaded area in Figure 4). The introduction of system adaptation measures provides for the increase in system
resilience (line shaded area in Figure 4), where the system performance without adaptation measures is shown by
grey dashed line and with adaptation measures as full black line. The adaptive capacity can be achieved by:
proactive adjustment measures and reactive recovery measures.
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Figure 4: Typical performance process of an infrastructure system
3.3.1 Proactive adjustment capacity metric
With the three features above, proactive adjustment capacity of individual infrastructure network subject to a
disturbance  1 can be illustrated as the dotted area in Figure 4 and represented as ρ PA,ζ1 .



[13]

ρPA,ζ1 =

SP0,ζ1 (t)

,ζ1
R Rap

,ζ1
1 R Rap

where 1 in the denominator refers to the undisturbed system performance. For a multilayer infrastructure system
network, the proactive adjustment capacity metric denote by PA1 .


[14]

PA1 =



SP0,ζ1 (t)

,ζ1
R Rap
1
1 R ζRap

3.3.2 Reactive recovery capacity metric
Reactive recovery capacity of individual infrastructure network subject to a disturbance  1 can be illustrated as the
line shaded area in Figure 4 and represented as ρ RR,ζ1 .



[15]

ρ RR,ζ1 =

,ζ1
R Res
(t)

,ζ1
R Rap

,ζ1
1 R Rap

1
For a multilayer infrastructure system network, reactive recovery capacity metric is ρ ζRR
.


[16]

1
ρζRR
=

,ζ1
R Res
(t)

1
 R φ,ζ
Rap
1
1 R ζRap

3.3.3 Resilience metric
Resilience of a single layer infrastructure network  and multilayer infrastructure network to disturbance  1 is
represented as r1 and r 1 , which are calculated as follows.
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Above metrics are derived for a single disturbance. Under a sequence of disturbances 1 ,  2 ,K  d  , single layer and
multilayer infrastructure system resilience is the integral of the resilience under all single disturbances, which can be
represented as r1 ,2 K d and r 1 , 2 K d , and calculated as follows.
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It's worth noting that the robustness under subsequent disturbances is always weaker than of the previous
disturbance. This is because the time between sequential disturbances is always shorter than the time needed for the
recovery to undisturbed level.
The resilience model developed in this work needs to be enhanced for the spatial distribution of disturbances. First,
a disturbance is represented as the removal of elements of the network. As natural disasters, such as severe weather
conditions, earthquakes, hurricanes or floods always strike geographically confined areas, cell space method should
be investigated. Second, system robustness to a specific disaster can be different as the structure of infrastructure
system changes. The proactive adjustment capacity changes accordingly. Third, reactive recovery capacity can also
be improved through resourcefulness and rapidity. Both of them are determined by the adaptation/restoration
strategy, which is the focus of single layer infrastructure network resilience. At last, duration of infrastructure
malfunction does not only depend on the repair time, but also the buffering time T B and state of dependent
infrastructure systems. So infrastructure system resilience analysis needs systematic understanding of internal
infrastructure features, external disturbance attributes and overall integration platform.
4. DISCUSSION
Resilience is presented as an efficient approach for the management of infrastructure systems. This paper
establishes multilayer infrastructure system resilience model based on the Space-Time Dynamic Resilience Measure
of Simonovic and Peck (2013) with consideration of infrastructure interdependences. By considering system
performance, its adaptation capacity and consequences of specific restoration strategies, the resilience is represented
as a dynamic measure to be implemented using system simulation.
Infrastructure system resilience needs systems approach. As infrastructure systems mutually interact understanding
of system interdependences is essential for infrastructure system resilience analysis. This paper details macroperspective interdependences of infrastructure systems into micro dependence patterns, and integrates them through
system dynamics analyses. So the resilience metric could be used for evaluation of different kinds of infrastructure
systems with cascading failures or other high-order impacts. Also the presented model could be a generic framework
or a methodology for the resilience analysis of systems-of-systems.
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Finally, actual infrastructure system are more complex. Integrating consequences of disaster uncertainty into
infrastructure system evolution is another potential contribution of the model to be addressed in future work.
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